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FRAMBACH v. DUNIHUE: THE MOST
UNDERRATED DECISION
Russell L. Weaver*
In presenting a truly unique set of facts, Frambach v. Dunihue is an
underrated remedies decision because it raises so many questions about
common remedies doctrines. Through an examination of the complex
familial relationship involved in the case, this Article outlines how
Frambach can be used as a unique teaching device to shed light on the
boundaries of restitution and estoppel claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frambach v. Dunihue' is among the most "underrated" remedies
decisions. The decision is not an underrated decision because of the
brilliance of the legal reasoning. On the contrary, Frambach does
not dazzle the reader with its brilliance, and the decision is not avant-
garde or cutting edge in its approach to the issues presented. Indeed,
the court did not definitively resolve the issues before it. The court
simply decided that the lower court had erred and remanded the
matter to the lower court for further hearings and findings while
appending some thoughts about how the lower court might resolve
the case.2 Moreover, in terms of legal reasoning, it is not clear that
Frambach "got it right."
So, you might ask, how in the world can Frambach be classified
as one of the most underrated remedies decisions? Frambach is
underrated because of its teachability. The case arises out of an
absolutely extraordinary set of facts, which the judge described as an
"amazing account of human relationships."3 In addition, the case
presents issues that are not only unique but interesting and engaging.
Moreover, the facts raise so many questions that the case allows both
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, Louis D.
Brandeis School of Law.
1. 419 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
2. Id. at 1117.
3. Id. at 1116.
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professors and students to wander around the remedies curriculum
asking (and trying to resolve) all sorts of stimulating issues.
In this short Article, I try to do a couple of things. First, I
outline the facts of the case and the decision. Second, I suggest some
of the many issues raised by the case. In the end, I hope the reader
will agree that Frambach is underrated in terms of its teachability-
if not in its legal logic or the wisdom of its result.
II. THE FACTS
Frambach involves two families who coexisted for nearly three
decades before coming to a disagreeable termination of their
relationship (for reasons that remain unknown).' At the beginning of
the Frambach opinion, Judge Upchurch raises the issue that baffles
everyone who examines the case: "Why people who for many years
had demonstrated an incredible ability to solve their disputes would
ultimately end up in litigation is mystifying."5
The unusual story begins with Dunihue, a widower with seven
children ranging in age from three to eleven years, who lived near
the Frambachs, who had four children of their own.6 The families
were introduced to each other when Mrs. Frambach asked if she
could take the Dunihue children to church and was allowed to do so.
Over time, Mrs. Frambach began to babysit the Dunihue children and
became closer to the entire family. The Frambachs' relationship
with the Dunihues solidified when the families endured a hurricane
in the Frambachs' home. Afterwards, the families decided to see if
they could live together.7
The difficulty with the common living arrangement was that the
Frambachs' home, the chosen home for the two families, was very
small.' It contained only a bedroom, a living room, and a kitchen,
which totaled six hundred square feet. Mr. Dunihue enlarged the
house by adding a bedroom and a bathroom and by making various
other improvements. In the ensuing years, Mr. Dunihue continued to
improve the home, which was worth $65,000 at the date of
separation. When Mrs. Frambach had another child sometime later,
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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there were fifteen people (twelve children and three adults) living in
the two bedroom house. This situation continued until some of the
children reached the age of majority and moved out.9
Under the arrangement between the Frambachs and Mr.
Dunihue, Mrs. Frambach ran the household, did the cooking, and
oversaw the children, who were expected to do the cleaning,
washing, and other appropriate chores. ° As a general rule, Mr.
Dunihue had a larger income than Mr. Frambach, but both Mr.
Frambach and Mr. Dunihue deposited their paychecks in bank
accounts that Mrs. Frambach was allowed to draw on to pay
household expenses. She was given discretion regarding whether to
pay a particular bill from one account as opposed to another." In
Mr. Dunihue's view, "it was just one family and whatever money
was available was used wherever it was most needed." 2 Indeed, it
was not uncommon for the Frambachs and Mr. Dunihue to jointly
shop for clothes, furniture, and automobiles.
After nineteen years of living together, when all of Mr.
Dunihue's children were grown, Mrs. Frambach abruptly terminated
the living arrangement. 3 She did so by calling Mr. Dunihue at work
and telling him that he had thirty minutes to move out. Mrs.
Frambach never offered any explanation for her ultimatum.1"
III. THE DECISIONS
After his ejection, Mr. Dunihue sought to impose an equitable
lien on the Frambachs' home. 5 He based his claim on a couple of
arguments. First, he claimed that the Frambachs had promised him a
place to live for the rest of his life in exchange for his work. 6
Second, he claimed that he relied on that promise in exchange for
making improvements to the home and that the Frambachs would be
unjustly enriched at his expense if they were allowed the keep the
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1116-17.
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improvements without paying for them.1" For their part, the
Frambachs denied that they had promised Dunihue a place to live for
the rest of his life and claimed that the improvements were necessary
in order to make the house suitable for so many people. 8
After considering the evidence, the trial court awarded Mr.
Dunihue an equitable lien against the Frambachs' home, concluded
that the two families had operated as a "single family," and held that
"the association of the parties was almost as close as though there
had been a single wife and two husbands."' 9 The court concluded
that the parties had pooled their assets and commingled everything
into a common pot with the intention of assuring Dunihue "that he
would have a home as long as he lived."2 In determining the amount
of the lien, the court noted that the Frambachs began with $20,000
equity in their home. Given that the parties had treated everything as
equal, the court treated the breakup as similar to a divorce and
concluded that the "only fair thing to do is to make them tenants in
common right down the middle."'"
Although the appellate court recognized that a court may impose
a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment, the court held that a
constructive trust could not be imposed in favor of an individual who
made improvements to another person's land.2 When one party
helps improve the home of another, she is entitled to an equitable
lien for the value of the improvements because "[n]either a
constructive trust nor a resulting trust arises in favor of a person who
pays no part of the purchase price even though he pays for
improvements on the property."23  At most, he is entitled to
reimbursement.24 Applying these principles, the court emphasized
that there was no promise or agreement by the Frambachs to deed
part of their property to Dunihue and no evidence that Dunihue had
paid a portion of the purchase price. As a result, the appellate court
reversed the trial court's judgment awarding Dunihue a one-half
17. Id. at 1117.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 161, cmt. a.).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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interest in the property. There was insufficient evidence to support
an award of a constructive trust.
2 5
Rather than decide these issues itself, the appellate court
remanded the case for further fact-finding and a second decision.26
The trial court was specifically directed to attempt to determine the
"value of the respective contributions of Dunihue and the
Frambachs" by "calculating the fair market value of the
improvements attributable to Dunihue and the fair market value of
the services rendered by the Frambachs to him during the nineteen
years the parties lived together."27 However, the court suggested that
the trial court might alternatively attempt to determine "the cost to
Dunihue for his labor, services and material in making the
improvements as compared to the cost to the Frambachs of providing
services to Dunihue."28 In passing, the appellate court surmised that
"under either measure, the contributions of the parties will be
equal."29  On the other hand, "if the court finds that Dunihue's
contributions exceed the value of the benefits received by him from
the Frambachs, an equitable lien in this amount should be imposed to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the Frambachs."3
IV. TEACHABILITY
Frambach allows a remedies professor to discuss a host of
issues. Not only does the case raise interesting restitution questions,
but it also raises estoppel issues.
A. Estoppel Claims
Of course, running throughout the Frambach case is the
assertion that the Frambachs agreed to provide Dunihue with a place
to live for the rest of his life in exchange for his improvements to the
house, his income, and access to his bank account for family
expenses.' As every first-year contracts student knows, courts can
"estop" individuals from denying their promises and enforce those
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1116.
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promises. 32  The classic example of estoppel is Feinberg v. Pfeiffer
Co.," a case in which a company passed a resolution offering a long-
time employee, Ms. Feinberg, a pension of $200 per month for life
upon her retirement for "long and faithful service. 34 Relying on the
pension offer, Feinberg decided to retire.35  Although the company
paid the pension for some time, it ultimately sought to renege on its
promise. 6 Relying on the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,37 the
court applied promissory estoppel principles and precluded the
employer from withdrawing the pension.38 The court asked a
rhetorical question: "Was there such an act on the part of plaintiff, in
reliance upon the promise contained in the resolution, as will estop
the defendant, and therefore create an enforceable contract under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel? 39  Relying on the Restatement,
40
the court answered this question in the affirmative: "we think there
was."
41
In analyzing the Frambach case, students must think about
whether the Frambachs should be estopped from refusing to provide
permanent housing to Dunihue. In analyzing that issue, the answer is
not as clear as it was in Feinberg. In that case, the requirements of a
promise and reliance were clearly proven.42  Not only had the
corporation adopted a resolution granting Ms. Feinberg a pension for
her long years of service, she offered testimony suggesting that she
32. See Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Ricketts v.
Scothom, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb. 1898).
33. 322 S.W.2d 163.
34. Id. at 164.
35. Id. at 166.
36. Id. at 165.
37. Id. at 167-68. The court cited section 90 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts for
the following proposition: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
38. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 168.
39. Id. at 168.
40. Id. at 167. The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, section 75 states that
"[c]onsideration for a promise is (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the
creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise, bargained for and
given in exchange for the promise." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
41. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 168.
42. Id. at 167.
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retired in reliance on the pension.43
In Frambach, the evidence of estoppel is considerably more
muddled. Although Dunihue asserted that the Frambachs promised
him lifetime housing, the Frambachs denied that they made the
promise.44 Moreover, even if students are able to conclude that a
promise existed, the court would then have to determine whether
Dunihue had relied on the promise and that his reliance was
reasonable. The case presents interesting questions on that point.
Can someone like Dunihue reasonably rely on a promise that the
Frambachs will provide him with housing for the rest of his life?
That is a very long time, and the circumstances between the parties
can change over time (as they evidently did).
Of course, even if students are willing to find the elements of
promissory estoppel, they must then address a host of remedial
questions. In Feinberg, the court ordered the Pfeiffer Company to
perform its promise by providing Ms. Feinberg a pension for the rest
of her life.45 Do students really think that a court is going to order
the Frambachs to perform their promise by providing Dunihue with
housing for the rest of his life? What about the host of decisions
suggesting that courts will not enforce contracts for personal
services?46  Those cases suggest that courts are concerned about
foisting unwilling parties on each other,47 as well as involuntary
servitude issues4" and concerns that specific enforcement of a
personal services contract will embroil the court in continuing
supervision problems.49 Ultimately, most students will conclude that
specific performance (in the sense of requiring actual compliance
with the promise) is unrealistic.
Even if a court is unwilling to order the Frambachs to actually
43. Id. at 166.
44. Frambach v. Dunihue, 419 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
45. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 169.
46. See generally Wash. Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1202
(N.D. Cal. 1969) (granting plaintiff basketball team preliminary injunctive relief against a player
from another team so long as he was in default under the franchise contract); Lumley v. Wagner
(1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 689 (Q.B.) (granting plaintiff theater injunctive relief against a singer
from performing at any other venue while under contract to sing solely at that venue).
47. See Wash. Capitols, 304 F. Supp. at 1202; Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 689.
48. See Wash. Capitols, 304 F. Supp. at 1202; Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep 687.
at 689.
49. See Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 692; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366
(1981).
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house Dunihue, students must then think about whether a court
should order them to specifically perform their promise by paying for
Dunihue's housing and support for the rest of his life. Is a court
likely to impose such an order? The cost would be significant if not
prohibitive. In a close case, will the cost influence the court when
determining whether there was a promise or reasonable reliance?
B. Restitution
Of course, the primary focus of both the trial and appellate court
opinions in the Frambach case is on the restitution issue. As
students think about whether the Frambachs must pay Dunihue
restitution, they must consider basic remedial issues. Were the
Frambachs "enriched" at Dunihue's expense?" If so, is the retention
of that enrichment "unjust?"'"
Was there "enrichment" in the traditional sense? Students can
readily find "enrichment" in two senses. First, over the decades,
Dunihue made numerous improvements to the Frambachs' home,
including the immediate addition of an extra bedroom and an
additional bathroom to the house.52 In addition, over the course of
the ensuing decades, Dunihue continued to make improvements to
the home. 3 Further, over the decades, Dunihue regularly deposited
his paycheck in a bank account that Mrs. Frambach had access to and
used to pay various bills for the family.54 As a result, it is difficult to
argue that Dunihue did not confer a "benefit" or an "enrichment" on
the Frambachs.
Students must also think about how to measure the enrichment.
In resolving that issue, students must first think about the house. Is it
appropriate or permissible to simply determine the difference
between the fair market value of the Frambachs' home at the time of
trial and the original purchase price? Should a court not take
inflation into account, which would have resulted in an increase in
the value of the home with or without any improvements or
50. See generally W. Coach Corp. v. Roscoe, 650 P.2d 449, 455 (Ariz. 1982) (holding
defendants unjustly enriched when plaintiff repaired and restored defendants' mobile home).
51. See generally Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 146 S.E.2d 434, 439 (N.C. 1966) (holding
defendant unjustly enriched by assuming dominion over a house without paying for its
construction).
52. Frambach v. Dunihue, 419 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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additions? In regard to the money taken from Dunihue's bank
account, how is it possible to know whether it constituted an
"enrichment" to the Frambachs? After all, does not an assessment of
enrichment require some understanding or knowledge of how the
money was spent? If it was spent purchasing clothes for Dunihue's
children, is there really an enrichment? On the other hand, if the
money was spent to make improvements to the home or to pay for
the Frambachs' vacation, is the court more likely to find an
enrichment?
Of course, students must also think about whether it is "unjust"
to allow the Frambachs to retain any "enrichment" without paying
for it. The difficulty with the Frambach case is that the enrichment
was not all one-sided. Over the years, Mrs. Frambach watched
Dunihue's children for him and cooked meals for the entire family,
including Dunihue and his children." There is undoubtedly a
"value" that should be attached to these services, and Dunihue was
undoubtedly "enriched" by receiving them. Accordingly, as the
appellate court suggests, a reasonable unjust enrichment calculation
requires the court to attempt to place some value on the benefits
received by Dunihue and to offset those benefits against the
enrichment that he bestowed on the Frambachs."
Students must then think about how to make the relative
calculations. Is it really possible to fairly value not only the benefits
conveyed by Mrs. Frambach to the Dunihue family over such a long
period of time, but also to assess the benefits the Frambachs received
over that same period? Is a wage to be attached to the value of Mrs.
Frambach's services? If so, what value per hour (or week or
month)? Over the twenty-seven year period, how many hours of
benefit did she convey on the Dunihue family? On a relative basis,
what is the level of enrichment?
The reality is that the parties may be unable, indeed are likely to
be unable, to precisely calculate the benefits they conferred on each
other. It is doubtful that Mrs. Frambach has precise records showing
the number of hours she spent over several decades cooking for the
joint families and taking care of the Dunihue children. At best, she
can make an estimate of the hours and attach an approximate value.
55. Id.
56. Id. at t117.
Fall 2008]
246 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol. 42:237
Likewise,. for Dunihue, it is unlikely that he will be able to
definitively show what monies were taken from his bank account
over the decades and how the money was spent.
Assuming that the parties have adequate records of their
contributions to the joint household, it might be possible to create an
accurate estimate of the benefits that Dunihue conferred on the
Frambachs and the benefits that they conferred on him. In the
absence of adequate records, the calculations become difficult if not
impossible. If so, perhaps the appellate court was correct in
assuming that the value of the benefits received by Dunihue provide
a full offset to the money and services he provided. 7
VI. CONCLUSION
I hope that the foregoing discussion reveals why Frambach v.
Dunihue is an extraordinary teaching device. The case presents an
unusual set of facts and unique legal issues that professors and their
classes can wrestle with for some time. Not only does the case
present the restitution issues, which were specifically discussed by
the appellate court, it also presents questions of contract and
estoppel. Moreover, the broad issues are not only interesting but
complex. There is much to think about and discuss to determine
whether the Frambachs were unjustly enriched (something that the
appellate court doubts), as well as the amount of the enrichment.
Moreover, the facts are compelling enough to engage the student
attention.
57. Id.
